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Public significance statement 
We propose that researchers studying judicial decision-making ought to examine decisions made 
on real(istic) cases using a representative experimental design, and they should analyze 
individual judge or bench decision data using psychologically plausible models. This will make 
the research more relevant to the judiciary and thus make it more difficult for judges and legal 
policy-makers to ignore the findings. 
Abstract 
According to the scales of justice, the judge, in an unbiased way and directed by law, attends to 
all of the available information in a case, weighs it according to its significance, and integrates it 
to make a decision. By contrast, research suggests that judicial decision-making departs from the 
cognitive balancing act depicted by the scales of justice. Nevertheless, the research is often 
dismissed as irrelevant, and the judiciary, legal policy-makers and the public remain largely 
unconvinced that the status quo needs improving. One potential rebuttal to the scientific findings 
is that they lack validity because researchers did not study judges making decisions on real cases. 
Another potential argument is that researchers have not pinpointed the psychological processes 
of any specific judge because they analyzed data over judges and/or used statistical models 
lacking in psychological plausibility. We review these two grounds for appeal against the 
scientific research on judicial decision-making, and note that it appears researchers’ choices of 
data collection methods and analytic techniques may, indeed, be inappropriate for understanding 
the phenomena. We offer two remedies from the sphere of decision-making research: collecting 
data on judicial decision-making using representative design, and analyzing judicial decision 
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data using more psychologically plausible models. Used together, we believe these solutions can 
help researchers better understand and improve legal decision-making. 
The scales of justice represent an ancient and near universal depiction of the judicial 
decision-making process. According to this metaphor, judges as triers of fact, in an unbiased way 
and directed by the law, carefully attend to all of the available information in a case, weigh it 
according to its significance for the issue at hand, and integrate it to make a decision. A judge’s 
ability to perform this cognitive balancing act when making highly consequential decisions is 
almost accepted as a given: after all, judges are recruited on the basis of their “sound judgment” 
(e.g., see Judicial Appointments Commission, 2011). And, when judicial decisions are 
challenged, it is typically not on the basis of a judge’s poor or biased decision-making but rather 
on the basis of some misapplication of law, procedural mistake or error in holding that the 
evidence supported the outcome (Cohen, 2006). Finally, judges themselves are highly confident 
in their decision-making (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). 
For decades, however, there has been a constant trickle of scholarly research in several 
disciplines including psychology, law, and criminology, suggesting that judicial decision-making 
departs from the rational ideal depicted by the scales of justice. For instance, past research has 
found that judicial decisions are affected by a myriad of extra-legal factors such as those related 
to the personal characteristics of the defendant or plaintiff including his/her gender, race and age 
(e.g., Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Manning, Carroll, & Carp, 2004; Mitchell, 2005; Rachlinski, 
Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2009; Robbennolt, 2002; Turner & Johnson, 2006). Judges’ own 
gender, race and age have also been found to influence their decisions (e.g., Wooldredge, Griffin, 
& Thistlethwaite, 2013; Chew & Kelley, 2008; Coontz, 2000; Kulik, Perry, & Pepper, 2003; 
Martin & Pyle, 2004; Peresie, 2004). Studies have also demonstrated that judicial decisions are 
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distorted by cognitive illusions such as framing effects, anchoring, and hindsight bias (e.g., 
Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001; Hastie & Viscusi, 
1998; Rachlinski, Guthrie, & Wistrich, 2011) and biased by non-cognitive factors such as hunger 
(Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). In addition, there is evidence of intra-judge 
inconsistency, i.e., a judge’s decisions differ from test to re-test, and inter-judge inconsistency, 
i.e., judges disagree on a decision for the same case (e.g., Collins, 2008; Dhami & Ayton, 2001; 
Robbennolt, 2002). Finally, studies show that judges may use simple heuristic strategies to make 
their decisions that ignore much of the available, relevant information (e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami 
& Ayton, 2001; Guthrie et al., 2001; Englich et al., 2006; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).  
Although the scientific research suggests that the notion of judges performing a cognitive 
balancing act is a myth, the judicial community has seemingly managed to dismiss the empirical 
evidence as irrelevant. Legal policy-makers and the public also appear to remain largely 
unconvinced that judicial decision-making needs much improvement. Indeed, little reference is 
made to empirical research findings either in media articles criticizing judicial decisions, in 
judicial training, or during the development of legal policies.  
One of the main rebuttals to the scientific findings is that the research lacks internal and 
external validity (i.e., arguments that researchers do not measure what they claim to be 
measuring, and that which exists beyond the laboratory) because researchers did not study judges 
making decisions on real cases. Here, the lack of realism or representativeness of the case stimuli 
presented to judges is of key concern.  
Another potential argument against the scientific findings is that they lack relevance to 
any specific judge because researchers have analyzed data aggregated over groups of judges 
and/or used statistical models lacking in psychological plausibility to describe judges’ cognitive 
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processes. This criticism highlights that judicial decision-making research is ultimately a 
psychological undertaking and so the psychological applicability and plausibility of models used 
to capture such decisions is important. In addition, being able to pinpoint individual judges’ 
decision strategies means that research can be used to hold judges to account. 
In the present paper, we review these two grounds for appeal against the scientific 
research on judicial decision-making. We demonstrate that researchers’ traditional choice of data 
collection methods and analytic techniques may indeed be inappropriate for understanding 
judicial decision-making. We offer two alternatives for future research: representative design for 
collecting data on judicial decision-making, and more psychologically plausible models for 
analyzing judicial decision data. We conclude that when used together, this data collection 
method and analytic technique can help researchers better understand judicial decision-making.  
Data Collection Methods and Analytic Techniques 
Researchers investigating judicial decision-making have used a variety of data collection 
methods (see Dhami & Belton, 2015). These include interview and questionnaire surveys of 
judges who report their decision-making strategies (e.g., Harris & Jesilow, 2000); observations 
of court hearings (e.g., Dhami, 2003); document analyses of court records (e.g., Baumer, 
Messner, & Felson, 2006); analysis of official court statistics (e.g., Merrall, Dhami & Bird, 
2010); and experiments with judges deciding on hypothetical cases (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001).  
Researchers have also used a variety of data analytic techniques beyond descriptive 
statistics such as tests of mean differences (e.g., Rachlinski, Guthrie, & Wistrich, 2011) and 
correlational and predictive (regression) statistics (e.g., Merrall et al., 2010). Next, we evaluate 
these data collection methods and analytic techniques in the study of judicial decision-making. 
‘Researchers Did Not Study Judges Making Decisions on Real Cases’ 
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The argument that research findings lack validity because researchers did not study 
judges making decisions on real cases can be applied to interview and questionnaire surveys of 
judges and experiments on judges. Beyond the failures of memory, there are well-known 
problems arising from asking people to report their decision-making strategies. Among other 
things, data may be unreliable and invalid because of social desirability response bias (Paulhus, 
1991). People also have difficulty introspecting about their cognitive processes (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; but see Newell & Shanks, 2014). In addition, interview and questionnaire surveys 
of judges cannot answer causal questions about the factors that influence judicial decisions.  
Although experimental studies can identify cause-effect relationships, they are often 
criticized for lacking validity. In ‘systematic’ experimental design, the researcher selects one or a 
few independent variables of interest (e.g., defendant’s gender and offence) and manipulates 
them so they vary systematically while holding other extraneous and potentially confounding 
variables constant or allowing them to vary randomly. The researcher then measures the resulting 
changes in the dependent variable(s) (e.g., judge’s sentencing decision). Here, one can imagine 
creating artificial cases or rare combinations of factors that judges are not experienced in dealing 
with (e.g., elderly, female defendants being sentenced for violent or sexual offences), and so 
studies may not elicit natural response patterns (i.e., lack internal validity; see e.g., Hammond & 
Stewart, 1974; Moore & Holbrook, 1990; Phelps & Shanteau, 1978). We address this issue 
further in our discussion of representative design. 
The findings of research involving judges making decisions on hypothetical cases may 
also be difficult to generalize to cases beyond the laboratory situation (i.e., lacking in external 
validity). The hypothetical cases typically used in experimental studies are necessarily brief and 
lack the richness of detail present in real life cases. Concern over generalizability is particularly 
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great when researchers study the effect of only one variable, often resulting in judges making 
decisions on a single case. Later, in our discussion of representative design, we consider how 
researchers can examine cause-effect relations between information presented to a judge and 
his/her decisions, without threatening the internal and external validity of the research findings.  
Clearly, the argument that research findings lack internal and external validity because 
researchers did not study judges making decisions on real cases does not apply to studies 
involving courtroom observations and analyses of court records and statistics. However, this 
does not imply that these are the most appropriate methods to use. This is because although these 
methods involve judges deciding on real cases, they are limited in their ability to determine the 
cause-effect relations between information presented to judges and their decisions. At most, 
these methods can provide evidence of the factors that are associated with judicial decisions. In 
addition, courtroom observational studies tend to be limited in their ability to reliably and validly 
observe all information presented to a judge and/or his/her decision behavior. Similarly, the 
findings of studies involving data recorded in court records or published in official statistics may 
be limited due to the lack of relevant data being available from these sources.  
‘Researchers Analyzed Data Aggregated Over Groups of Judges and/or Using 
Psychologically Implausible Statistical Models’ 
The argument that research findings lack relevance to any specific judge because 
researchers have analyzed data aggregated over groups of judges and/or used statistical models 
that lack psychological plausibility holds true. Analysis of judicial decision-making data using 
the nomothetic tradition is commonplace in studies using real cases (e.g., studies based on 
officially published court statistics) and hypothetical ones (e.g., experimental studies). Group 
differences in decisions made on multiple cases or one case are often analyzed using means and 
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standard deviations, followed by regression analyses or analysis of variance. While nomothetic 
research has a role to play in understanding wider trends across a particular jurisdiction, it is 
unclear to what extent such studies can capture the decision strategy of any individual judge. 
This creates difficulties when seeking to persuade judges of the relevance of a given study to 
their practice. In addition, it is likely that individual judges have different judgment strategies 
from one another, and may differ in the strategy they use from one case to another (e.g., Dhami 
& Ayton, 2001). Exploring such differences is an important part of understanding judicial 
decision-making, and nomothetic research cannot examine such inter- or intra-judge variation in 
the same way as idiographic research can (multi-level models can be used to analyze judge-level 
differences but cannot determine individual decision strategies; see Dhami & Belton, 2016). 
 Less commonly, but more appropriately, some researchers have followed the idiographic 
tradition and examined the decision-making of individual judges making decisions over multiple 
cases (e.g., Konečni & Ebbesen, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allegeier, 1996). However, when 
analyzing the data, they use correlational and predictive (regression) statistics, and often appear 
to treat these models as an isomorphic representation of the judicial decision-making process (i.e., 
as if they actually represent what goes on within a judge’s mind). For instance, when reporting 
the results of a study of judges’ sentencing decisions, Konečni and Ebbesen (1984, p.13) 
concluded that “Multiple regression and causal analyses revealed that in almost 90% of the cases 
the judge was responding directly to only one factor”.  The findings of studies using such 
statistical models lack relevance because these models are psychologically implausible – judges 
cannot compute these statistics in their heads. Consequently, computationally complex statistical 
models are “an unrealistic description of how people make decisions” (Marewski, Gaissmaier, & 
Gigerenzer, 2010, p. 105). Although as Hoffman (1960, p. 125) points out, all models are only a 
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“paramorphic representation” of the judgment process, he also warns that the use of statistical 
models means “one cannot conclude that the mental process has been ‘discovered’” (p. 124). We 
discuss issues of psychological plausibility in more detail later. 
In the next two sections, we describe how two approaches developed by researchers 
investigating the psychology of human judgment and decision-making generally can be used to 
obtain and analyze judicial decision-making data that are potentially more valid and 
generalizable. These two approaches are representative design and use of non-statistical, more 
psychologically plausible models of decision-making. 
Collect Judicial Decision Data Using Representative Design 
The psychological research carried out by Egon Brunswik offers a methodology for 
collecting data that better reflects judges’ real world decision-making. Brunswik asserted that 
psychological processes are adapted to the environments in which they function (Brunswik, 1952, 
1955, 1956). In his theory of probabilistic functionalism, Brunswik (1952) described the nature 
of this adaptation which is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, in order to achieve a distal criterion, 
individuals must learn to infer it from proximal cues.
1
 Decision environments are typically 
probabilistic as cues are only uncertain indicators. These environments may present opportunities 
for inter-substituting interrelated cues. Thus, when studying psychological processes, researchers 
ought to use stimuli that are representative of the environments to participants have learned to 
respond. Brunswik called this ‘representative design’ (see Dhami, Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2004). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The stimuli presented to participants should be representative of the decision 
environment in terms of the nature and number of cues (e.g., defendant age, seriousness of 
offence), their values (e.g., defendant age may be divided into young = 20-29, middle-aged = 30-
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59, and old = 60+), distributions (e.g., twice more young than old defendants), co-variation (e.g., 
defendant age negatively related to defendant health such that old defendants are in poorer 
health), and ecological validities (e.g., when making sentencing decisions in sex offence cases, a 
defendant’s age and health may be related to sentence severity). Brunswik (1955) suggested that 
if studying the full population of stimuli is impossible or impractical, researchers should 
randomly sample stimuli from a defined population or reference class of stimuli from the 
participant’s decision environment, and to which the researcher wants to generalize the findings. 
Thus, representative design also embraces the idiographic tradition, where each participant is 
presented with multiple stimuli and his/her behavior is measured over a series of responses. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the possible dependent variables that can be measured. Of particular 
relevance to researchers studying judicial decision-making are the weights (referred to as the 
‘cue utilization validities’) that an individual attaches to cues (i.e., how important he/she 
considers the various facts in a case to be). As we will discuss below, representative design 
enables researchers to examine how an individual perceives and responds to his/her environment, 
and his/her level of achievement (Brunswik, 1952). Findings can therefore be considered reliable 
and valid because they capture the individual’s natural response patterns. Representative design 
also enables generalizability of the findings beyond the laboratory or research context (Brunswik, 
1956). The findings can be used to predict an individual’s future behavior in the environment 
studied. We will discuss this further in relation to other research designs. 
In order to make representative design more practical, Hammond (1966) offered an 
alternative to conducting research in the field by distinguishing between substantive and formal 
situational sampling. Substantive situational sampling refers to Brunswik’s original proposal to 
sample real cases from a population. Formal situational sampling, by contrast, refers to the idea 
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that hypothetical stimuli can be constructed to be representative of real cases in a population in 
terms of cues, their values, distributions, inter-correlations and ecological validities (see 
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). 
Analytically, the lack of experimental control means that variables will naturally co-vary. 
Brunswik’s (1956) solution was to deal with co-variation at the analysis stage of research 
through, for example, partial correlations. The extent to which the problem of co-variation 
applies to specific judicial decision-making environments remains to be known. Dhami (2003) 
found that the average correlations among cues in bail hearings in two English courts were 
only .2 and .1, respectively.  
In order to draw a random sample of real stimuli as Brunswik proposed or to conduct 
formal situational sampling as Hammond suggested, the researcher needs to define a population 
or reference class of stimuli. This can be difficult, and while we cannot offer a complete solution 
to this problem, we suggest considering the environment as that which is subjectively interpreted 
by the individual. Thus, in a study on judicial decision-making, the reference class is determined 
following an examination of how a judge perceives and interprets the information relating to a 
specific decision task, for example, by performing a ‘task analysis’ (Cooksey, 1996).2 This could 
also include establishing the historical experience a judge has with the task. As Brunswik (1944) 
noted, an individual may approach the same task from different internal states (e.g., attitudes, 
motivations or emotions), and these could also be considered when defining the reference class. 
In acknowledging that representatively designed studies may not fully replace 
systematically designed studies, Brunswik (1944, p. 37) argued that at the very least 
representatively designed studies should be used as a type of “check-up” to assess the 
“soundness” of a systematically designed experiment. For example, in the judicial decision-
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making context, Dhami (2003) conducted a four-month observational study of bail hearings in 
two criminal courts inside and outside London, UK. The details of 342 hearings including the 
presence or absence of 25 cues (e.g., gender, community ties, and previous convictions), and the 
decisions made by benches of judges were recorded. Each court’s bail decisions were then 
analyzed separately.
3
 The study identified that bail decisions in each court were best predicted by 
models that included only three cues, and based a decision on only one of these in each case. 
This more representatively designed study verified the findings from an earlier study of 
individual judges’ bail decisions made on hypothetical cases designed via a fractional-factorial 
combination of nine cues, that suggested such decisions were made using a simple, non-
compensatory strategy (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). 
It is important that researchers studying judicial decision-making add representative 
design to their methodological toolbox because evidence suggests that design matters (see Dhami 
et al., 2004). For instance, research findings differ depending on how the stimuli (cases) 
presented to participants were designed. Hammond and Stewart (1974) trained participants to 
learn to achieve in a simple, two-cue environment, and found that the group of participants later 
presented with stimuli representative of this environment were more likely to use the cues in a 
linear way compared to the group later presented with stimuli comprising a factorial combination 
of the two cues. Others have found that participants presented with hypothetical stimuli designed 
using factorial combinations of cues used more cues or attached different weights to cues than 
participants presented with more realistic stimuli (Moore & Holbrook, 1990; Phelps & Shanteau, 
1978). Phelps and Shanteau (1978) proposed that the natural inter-correlation among variables 
may be at least partially responsible for the difference in judgment policies observed under 
different conditions. 
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The results of research demonstrating cognitive biases also appear to be affected by 
representative versus systematic stimulus sampling. For example, researchers have shown that 
the overconfidence effect (i.e., how well people are calibrated with the accuracy of their 
knowledge), occurs because past researchers did not sample general-knowledge questions 
randomly but instead systematically selected hard questions (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991). Similarly, Winman (1997) found that hindsight bias or the “I knew it all 
along” effect was prominent in general-knowledge questions involving paired-comparison tasks 
when the individual items in each pair were systematically selected rather than when they were 
representatively selected (i.e., drawn randomly from a specified reference class). 
In sum, critics of judicial decision-making research may argue that findings lack internal 
and external validity because researchers did not study judges making decisions on real cases. 
The concern is with the lack of realism or representativeness of the case stimuli presented to 
judges participating in research. In the future, researchers can respond to this by employing 
representative design when collecting data on judicial decisions. 
Analyze Individual Judges’ Decision Data Using Psychologically Plausible Models 
Selective perception, attention, sequential processing, limited computational ability, and 
limited memory all have implications for human decision-making. Under these circumstances, 
people may use decision-making strategies that reduce cognitive effort (e.g., Simon, 1956). In 
addition, the structure and demands of the decision task such as amount of information available 
and its redundancy, information presentation format and order, number of response options, and 
time pressure also influence how decisions are made. According to Hammond’s (1996, 2000) 
cognitive continuum theory, some of these task properties may lead people to abandon analytic 
thought and move to quasi-rational or intuitive cognition (see Dhami & Thomson, 2012; see also 
14 
 
Dhami, Belton, & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015). Empirical evidence supports these claims (e.g., 
Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000; Hamm, 1988; Hammond et al., 1987). 
The depiction of human decision-making by the statistical models used to analyze data from 
decision-making studies, however, is incompatible with these considerations.  
Since the mid-90s, researchers in the field of judgment and decision-making have argued 
that non-statistical, more psychologically plausible models ought to be used to capture the 
decision-making processes of individuals (e.g., Dhami & Harries, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996; Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Group, 1999), including court judges (Dhami, 2003, Dhami 
& Ayton, 2001; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). In particular, these researchers have 
proposed the use of simple process models called ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics as an alternative to 
past researchers’ over reliance on statistical (regression) models.  
As stated earlier, regression models are psychologically implausible. Beyond the complex 
statistical calculations involved, they depict an individual searching through all of the available 
information, and weighting and integrating it in a compensatory way when making a decision.
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Furthermore, these models provide only a static view of decision-making, as they suggest that 
the same cues are used in the same way in every case (Dhami & Harries, 2001). By contrast, 
simple heuristics are step-by-step process models that embody principles for information search, 
stop, and decision-making.
5
 For instance, cues may be searched in a specific order or randomly, 
and search may stop when the first cue supporting a particular decision is found (or if out of 
time). The decision-making process is considered to be fast and frugal as the heuristics search 
and use little information in a short period of time. Indeed, several simple heuristics are non-
compensatory as they base decisions on one cue alone, regardless of how many cues are searched. 
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These models also imply that individuals make decisions in a flexible manner (i.e., different cues 
can be used to make decisions on different cases).  
Simple heuristics have been developed for various types of decision tasks including two-
alternative choice tasks (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) and binary classification tasks (e.g., 
Dhami & Ayton, 2001). The ‘matching heuristic’ is a simple heuristic that has been successfully 
applied to judicial decision-making (Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001). This is used for 
binary classification tasks, and Figure 2 shows an example of the heuristic where the maximum 
number of cues searched is two. In the context of sentencing an assault case, imagine if the focal 
decision was custody while the default was community sentence, and the two cues might be 
seriousness of offence and previous convictions. When presented with a case, the heuristic 
assumes the judge searches these two cues in order for reasons (or critical cue values) to give a 
custodial sentence. If a critical cue value is found for a cue that is searched (e.g., the offence is 
‘very’ serious) then search is stopped and the heuristic predicts the judge will pass a custodial 
sentence. If not, then search continues until the last cue is searched, and if by this time none of 
the cues searched have a critical cue value, then the heuristic predicts the judge will make the 
default decision to pass a community sentence.
6
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The matching heuristic is derived on the basis of the relations between cues and decisions 
over a set of cases and so studies should present each judge with multiple cases, recording the 
cues available in these cases and the decisions made (see Table 5 in the Appendix to Snook, 
Dhami and Kavanagh, 2011, for full details of how the heuristic is computed). The critical cue 
value (reason to make a focal decision) for each cue is defined as the value of the cue that was 
most frequently assigned a focal decision (e.g., the critical cue value for the previous convictions 
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cue is ‘has priors’ if more cases with priors were given a custodial sentence than those without 
priors). The order of information search is by the rank order of cues as determined by their 
utilization validities: A cue’s utilization validity is the proportion of cases with the critical value 
that were assigned a focal decision (e.g., the proportion of cases with priors that were given a 
custodial sentence). Finally, the maximum number of cues searched by the heuristic (K) is 
determined by testing the fit of the heuristic with K = N cues, K = N-1 cues and so forth, until the 
K with best fit (i.e. highest percentage of decisions predicted correctly) is identified. 
The matching heuristic characterizes information search as lexicographic (ordered 
according to rank of cues determined by their utilization validities), and cue use as non-
compensatory since the decision is based on the value of one cue alone. It defines stopping rules 
in terms of particular (critical) values of cues, and distinguishes between a focal and a default 
decision. The psychological plausibility of the matching heuristic does not just lie in the fact that 
it is non-statistical and non-compensatory, but also in how it assumes individuals learn to use the 
strategy.
7
 It uses frequencies, which Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) argue are a natural form of 
processing since people (and other animals) seem to learn about contingencies through “natural 
sampling”, “sequential encoding and updating of event frequencies” in their environment (p. 
686). The heuristic also involves matching individual cases to a prototype that may be in the 
mind of a judge, and this is consistent with research on categorization (Estes, 1994). Finally, the 
matching heuristic exploits cues that may be acquired through direct experience in the domain. 
The means by which this is accomplished are likely to depend on the sort of mechanisms that 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) and others have identified as underlying the process of learning about 
causation and co-variation. The critical value embodies a type of positive-test bias in which only 
the information that indicates a focal decision is searched and used. There is general evidence for 
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such strategies in other domains (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987). These mechanisms are 
encapsulated in calculation of cue-utilization validities. 
Studies have shown that the matching heuristic is as good as regression and non-
statistical linear (compensatory) models in fitting decision data in expert or professional 
decision-making domains such as medicine, law and crime, and that it outperforms these 
compensatory models at cross-validation where it makes predictions on a new sample of data 
(e.g., Dhami & Harries, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2010; Kee et al., 2003; Snook et al., 2011). In 
the judicial decision-making context, Dhami and Ayton (2001) found that when predicting 
individual judges’ bail decisions on hypothetical cases comprising nine cues, the matching 
heuristic contained only one cue for 75% of the judges. When testing the power of the matching 
heuristic in predicting bail decisions against two additive (compensatory) strategies that used all 
nine cues (i.e., Franklin’s rule which differentially weighted the cues and Dawes’ rule which 
weighted cues equally), it was found that the matching heuristic performed better than the other 
two models (i.e., 66%, 59% and 63% of decisions predicted correctly by the matching heuristic, 
Franklin’s rule and Dawes’ rule, respectively). The heuristic also proved to be the best fit for a 
greater proportion of the judges.  
In a study predicting bail decisions made on real cases by benches (groups of judges) in 
two courts, Dhami (2003) found that the matching heuristic (containing only three out of a 
possible 25 cues available) correctly predicted, on average, 92% and 85% of decisions in court A 
and B, respectively. This was compared to the 86% and 73% of decisions predicted correctly in 
court A and B, respectively, by Franklin’s rule which contained all 25 cues.8  
In sum, it can be argued that the findings of most research into judicial decision-making  
lack relevance to any specific judge because researchers have analyzed data aggregated over 
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groups of judges and/or used psychologically implausible statistical models. In future, 
researchers can respond to this by applying more psychologically plausible models to the 
decision-making of individual judges, benches or courts. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Judicial decisions such as sentencing in a criminal case or awarding damages in a civil 
case can have huge ramifications for the individuals involved (e.g., loss of liberty and financial 
loss, respectively). In addition, these decisions can affect the social fabric of wider society which 
is partly bound together by perceptions of justice and fairness as well as a desire to punish 
wrongdoers and repair the harm done. Those who administer the justice system are also affected 
by judicial decisions (e.g., custodial sentences can have resource implications for the prison 
system). It is no surprise therefore, that judicial decisions come under great scrutiny. 
However, to-date, the judicial community and policy-makers in the areas of criminal and 
civil justice have generally managed to resist making changes to existing policies and practices 
based on the empirical findings obtained by researchers studying judicial decision-making. 
Judges have been able to argue, with some force, that for reasons such as those described earlier, 
the findings are invalid and/or not generalizable to the real world, that they tell us nothing useful 
or meaningful about how individual judges really do their job. The proposals we present in this 
article should help researchers in the future to rebut those arguments.   
We argue that ideally researchers wishing to understand how judges make their decisions 
should use representative design to collect data on judicial decisions and then analyze the data 
using psychologically plausible models. If decisions are made by individual judges, then study 
them individually. If decisions are made by benches, then study them as benches. Collect 
decision data across multiple cases. If one cannot ideally study decisions made on real cases in 
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real time, then sample cases representatively from those the judge/bench has already decided on. 
If this is not possible, then construct simulated/hypothetical cases that are representative of those 
the judge/bench normally would come across. Analyze the data by individual judge/bench, using 
psychologically plausible models for the specific decision-making task at hand.  
This calls for a shift away from commonly accepted research practices in disciplines such 
as psychology, criminology and law. At the very least, researchers should use a triangulated 
approach to studying judicial decision-making (e.g., using systematic and representative research 
designs, and compensatory and non-compensatory analytic models).
9
 Using the approach 
proposed here should ultimately allow researchers to learn more about the legal environments 
and judges that are the topic of their studies. Indeed, representative design requires that 
researchers understand the parameters of the decision environment in which a judge operates 
(e.g., cues, their ranges, distributions and combinations). Studies that additionally examine 
judicial decisions made under different relevant internal and external states (e.g., attitudes and 
time pressure, respectively) can provide further insights. In addition, the use of more 
psychologically plausible models requires that researchers understand human cognition and how 
it functions under different conditions. There is already a large body of knowledge that can be 
drawn upon, as well as existing models that can be applied (see Dhami, Schlottmann, & 
Waldmann, 2011; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011). 
The proposed changes to research practices in studies of judicial decision-making would 
allow researchers to generate both internally and externally valid findings that can illuminate 
whether judges’ decision strategies follow that depicted by the scales of justice metaphor. For 
example, are judges using the legally relevant information? Are they giving the legally relevant 
information more weight than extra-legal information? Are they integrating the legally relevant 
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information? An idiographic approach would additionally allow analysis of inter-judge variations 
in decision strategy. It would be much more difficult for judges and legal policy-makers to 
dismiss data of this kind as being irrelevant and so it could have greater impact than past 
research has had to-date.  
A meta-analytic view of research methodology highlights that how we study a 
phenomenon of interest has an impact on our research findings. It remains to be seen to what 
extent judges fall prey to a myriad of cognitive illusions that can bias their decisions, when they 
are actually tested under representative conditions. In an historical review of methodology, 
Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) observed evidence for a “tools-to-theories” hypothesis, where a 
“scientist’s tools…lend themselves to transformation into metaphors of mind” (p. 3). When more 
psychologically plausible models are tested, the findings dispel the myth of judicial decision-
making as a cognitive balancing act. The scales of justice represent a normative ideal that does 
not fit with psychological reality. 
Only when we can paint a valid and generalizable picture of judicial decision-making can 
we then attempt to understand why judicial behavior departs from the normative ideal. Once we 
can explain these departures, we can then try to develop interventions to improve judicial 
decision-making. Judicial decision-making research has not always gone beyond descriptive 
aims to explanation and intervention. Thus, there is much to do.  
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Endnotes 
1 
The distal criterion is not always obvious in the judicial domain. For instance, some may argue 
that judges ought to strive for decisions consistent with past ones in similar cases, while others 
might argue that judges ought to strive for decisions that are perceived to be just or fair.  
2 
A task analysis provides information about how a judge perceives his/her decision environment 
(e.g., number, nature of cues, inter-relations etc). This allows construction of representative 
stimuli which are then presented to the judge. His/her decision behavior is then measured. 
3 
Each court’s (rather than bench’s) decisions were modeled because benches were not static 
entities – judges in each court sat on different benches, and a bench made only a few decisions. 
4 
Although cue weights may be non-compensatory and non-linear terms may be included, it is 
generally assumed that judgments are the product of a linear, compensatory integration of 
multiple cues that are weighted optimally.  
5 
These heuristics differ from those characteristic of the “heuristics and biases” research program, 
which are vague about process and exclude pre-decisional behavior such as information search 
(see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). 
6
 There are different rules for missing/unavailable cue values depending on the task (Dhami, 
2003).  
7 
Indeed, not all heuristics are based on simple learning (Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011).  
8
 Similarly, von Helversen and Rieskamp (2009) found that a fast and frugal heuristic of 
quantitative estimation predicted German prosecutors’ decisions in real sentencing cases better 
than a linear regression model or Dawes’ rule. 
9 
Others have recently also argued that researchers ought to use a triangulated approach that 
incorporates qualitative data (Castro-Rodrigues & Sacao, 2012).  
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Figure 1. Adapted lens model. From “The conceptual framework of psychology.” In 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (p. 678), by E. Brunswik, 1952, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1952 by the University of Chicago Press. 
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Figure 2. Example of the Matching Heuristic where a maximum of 2 cues are searched. 
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